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We describe severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in France. Patients meeting the World Health
Organization definition of a suspected case underwent a
clinical, radiologic, and biologic assessment at the closest
university-affiliated infectious disease ward. Suspected
cases were immediately reported to the Institut de Veille
Sanitaire. Probable case-patients were isolated, their con-
tacts quarantined at home, and were followed for 10 days
after exposure. Five probable cases occurred from March
through April 2003; four were confirmed as SARS coron-
avirus by reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction,
serologic testing, or both. The index case-patient (patient
A), who had worked in the French hospital of Hanoi,
Vietnam, was the most probable source of transmission for
the three other confirmed cases; two had been exposed to
patient A while on the Hanoi-Paris flight of March 22–23.
Timely detection, isolation of probable case-patients, and
quarantine of their contacts appear to have been effective
in preventing the secondary spread of SARS in France.
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was recent-
ly identified as a new clinical entity (1). SARS likely
originated in the Guangdong Province of People’s
Republic of China (2) and subsequently spread worldwide
as infected persons traveled. During the 2003 outbreak,
SARS was primarily transmitted by person-to-person con-
tact between healthcare workers or household members
and ill patients (2). Community transmission also occurred
in several of the most affected areas, and an explosive out-
break from a common source occurred in Amoy Garden in
Hong-Kong (3). As of June 2003, a total of 8,477 probable
cases and 811 deaths had been reported from 32 countries
(4). Anovel coronavirus has been identified as the cause of
SARS (5–7). Based on current knowledge, SARS is trans-
mitted from symptomatic patients by close direct or indi-
rect contacts through respiratory droplet secretions (2). In
specific situations, other modes of transmission, such as
airborne spread, may be possible (8). The incubation peri-
od ranges from 2 to 10 days, allowing SARS to spread over
long distances by infected persons who travel (8,9). 
We describe how SARS was introduced in France
through a single patient who returned from Vietnam on
March 23 and present data that suggest transmission from
this patient to other passengers may have occurred during
his flight back from Hanoi to Paris.
Materials and Methods
After the World Health Organization (WHO) alert on
March 12, 2003, a centralized surveillance system was set
up for SARS in France (10). All persons who returned
from an area affected by recent transmission, had been in
contact with a probable case during the previous 10 days,
and in whom fever was >38°C, with cough or difficult
breathing, were advised to call the emergency service.
These persons were transported to the closest university-
affiliated infectious disease ward or one of the nine infec-
tious disease wards designated as a regional reference cen-
ter in the French plan of action against bioterrorism, using
masks for droplet protection. After performing clinical and
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Francebiologic evaluation and chest x-ray, the attending clinician
notified the Institut de Veille Sanitaire through a unique
telephone number. On the basis of the results of the initial
and subsequent evaluations, each notified case was either
discharged, kept as a suspect case, or classified as a prob-
able case using the WHO SARS case definition (10,11).
Probable and suspected case-patients were kept in isola-
tion until recovery or until the diagnosis was changed,
respectively. For this investigation, a probable case of
SARS was defined as previously described (12). 
For patients who fulfilled the definition of a probable
case, respiratory secretion specimens were taken from the
nose, throat, or sputum to detect for SARS–associated
coronovirus (CoV) by reverse transcription–polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) (7) at the National Reference
Center for Influenza (Northern France), Institut Pasteur,
Paris. RNAextraction and RT-PCR mixes were prepared in
designated rooms. RT-PCR procedures included appropri-
ate negative and positive controls in each run: two negative
controls for the extraction procedure and one water control
and one positive control for each PCR run. Two RT-PCR,
either both nested or one nested and one real-time, were
performed for each sample. Real-time RT-PCR, using the
SARS-CoV detection kit from Artus (Germany), included
an internal control that detected PCR inhibitory sub-
stances. One-step nested RT-PCR targeting either the
Bernhard Nocht Institute (BNI) or the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) fragment of the polymerase
gene was used (7,13). When real-time RT-PCR was per-
formed, which targets the BNI fragment, the other RT-PCR
was the nested RT-PCR targeting the CDC fragment of the
polymerase gene. The real-time and nested RT-PCR,
which targeted the BNI fragment reliably, detected 10
copies of RNA in the assay corresponding to 800 RNA
molecules per milliliter of specimen.
Acute and convalescent serum samples were also
obtained from probable cases. They were tested for
immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibodies against the SARS-CoV
using indirect immunofluorescence with Vero E6 cells
infected by the SARS-CoV, negative control Vero E6 cells
and fluorescein-labeled goat antihuman IgG. Results of
serologic testing were considered positive either in case of
seroconversion or a fourfold increase of observed titers, or
if the serum exhibited a titer >160. The detection limit of
our indirect immunofluorescence assay corresponded to
the first dilution used: 1/40. 
For each probable and confirmed case, information was
collected on clinical symptoms, chest x-ray findings,
leukocyte counts, illness onset date, demography, all pos-
sible contacts with a probable case, and exposures when
traveling to affected area (contact with any hospital or
place of potential transmission). Persons who did not use
masks for droplet protection and had contact with a symp-
tomatic probable or confirmed case of SARS were quaran-
tined at home for 10 days after exposure and contacted
daily by telephone. As recommended by WHO, this fol-
low-up included the passengers who sat within two rows of
a SARS case-patient on the Air France Hanoi-Paris flight
of March 22 and 23, 2003 (14). The crew of the Air France
flight was also followed for 10 days by the Air France
medical service. During follow-up interviews with the pas-
sengers seated close to the index patient (patient A), we
obtained a detailed description of his clinical condition, his
movements in the aircraft, the contacts he may have had
with other persons on board, and the timing of his board-
ing and deplaning in relation to other passengers, including
the stopover in Bangkok. Passengers on a flight in which a
person with a symptomatic probable case had traveled
were informed publicly through the media and mail of the
potential exposure and advised to call the emergency serv-
ice phone number to be evaluated and admitted to the clos-
est university-affiliated infectious disease ward if a fever
of >38°C developed within 10 days of the flight. 
We estimated the incidence density of SARS among
passengers who sat within two rows of a case of SARS in
the AF171 flight of March 22–23 by using the total num-
ber of person-hours as the denominator. Ninety-five per-
cent confidence intervals (95% CI) were calculated by
using the exact binomial method (15).
Results
As of April 30, a total of 394 suspected cases had been
notified to the Institut de Veille Sanitaire and 5 (1.3%) met
the definition of a probable case of SARS. Four were men,
and their ages were 26 to 56 years. All had fever >38°C,
four with nonproductive cough and two with dyspnea.
None had diarrhea. Chest x-rays showed interstitial pneu-
monia in four patients (bilateral for three) and alveolar
consolidation in one. Lymphocyte counts were 170 to
1,400/mm3. Four patients were lymphopenic
(<1,000/mm3); the same four patients also had thrombocy-
topenia. Severe hypoxemia that required mechanical ven-
tilation developed in one patient (the index case, patient
A). Four patients had been discharged from the hospital
within 8 to 21 days after onset, and one died (patient A)
from intensive-care complications 95 days after admission.
RT-PCR was positive for SARS-CoV in at least three of
the respiratory secretion samples taken on at least 2 differ-
ent days after onset of symptoms for three of the five
patients. Acute-phase and convalescent-phase serum sam-
ples were obtained for four of the probable cases, and sero-
conversion to SARS-CoV occurred in three samples,
including samples from the patient for whom RT-PCR was
negative (patient D, Figure 1). However, for patient D, the
only respiratory samples available for RT-PCR were taken
on day 2 after onset.  
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firmed cases (patient A to D, Figure 1). All four cases were
related to the outbreak that occurred in the French Hospital
in Hanoi, Vietnam (2). The index patient (patient A), who
had worked in this hospital, was the most probable source
of secondary transmission to the other three patients. On the
basis of information obtained from his colleagues, on
March 16 and 17, he was known to have examined, without
respiratory protection from droplet secretions, an ill physi-
cian in whom SARS subsequently developed. Although no
precise date of onset is available for patient A, interviews
with persons he had met in Hanoi during the few days
before his departure indicate that symptoms, such as cough
and severe fatigue, had developed as early as March 20.
From March 26 to April 1, three secondary cases
occurred (Figure 1), with incubation periods of 3, 4, and 10
days. Two cases occurred among the 371 passengers (166
boarded in Hanoi of whom 5 left in Bangkok, and 205
boarded in Bangkok) and 30 flight attendants of the Air
France Hanoi-Bangkok-Paris flight of March 22–23. The
last case (patient D) was the manager of the hotel where
patient Astayed in Hanoi. He became ill on April 1, a total
of 3 days after returning to Vietnam on March 29 through
another flight. He had had close contact with patient A on
March 22 while greeting and giving him his mail before
departure (Figure 1). No other exposure to cases of proba-
ble SARS or places where transmission of SARS had
occurred in Hanoi could be documented for patient D with-
in 10 days of symptom onset.
Seven persons sat within two rows of patient A during
the AF 171 flight (Figure 2), two of whom were medical
doctors and did not know him. They indicated that patient
A was breathing rapidly (superficial polypnea) and exhib-
ited extreme pallor and pursed lips during the entire flight.
He remained calm, had no cough, and left his seat at least
twice between Bangkok and Paris to go to the front lavato-
ry; at each move, he passed through the space between the
plane wall and seat 25K (Figure 2). During the stopover in
Bangkok, he disembarked with the passengers on the flight
from Hanoi to Bangkok and then reboarded the plane
before the passengers who embarked in Bangkok. On land-
ing at Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Paris Airport, he disem-
barked among the last passengers (about 20 passengers left
the plane after him) and was cared for by the CDG medical
services along with two other physicians who had worked
in the French Hospital in Hanoi and were on the same
plane.
Of the seven passengers who sat within two rows of
patient A, SARS developed in one (patient B, seat 25K),
which accounted for an incidence density rate of 1 per 100
person hours of exposure (1/98 hours; 95% CI 0.02 to 5.4).
He reported having handled the same aircraft magazines
and using the same lavatory as patient A (WC1, Figure 2).
Within 10 days of onset and while in Hanoi, patient B did
not report any contact with the French hospital, other hos-
pitals, or with any SARS patients, nor did he stay at the
same hotel as patient A. Another passenger who sat near
patient A(26K) reported a sore throat and a temperature of
37.6°C once during follow-up. 
The second patient (patient C) sat in seat 30B. He
boarded the plane in Bangkok and did not know patient A
and did not recall having had any interaction with him dur-
ing the flight. He used the toilets to the rear behind his seat
while patient A used the toilets nearest his seat up front
(Figure 2). He was among the first passengers leaving the
plane. He did not report any contact with ill persons or hos-
pitals while in Thailand.
Other contacts of patient A included two persons who
shared the same car to the Hanoi airport, one of whom had
met him for 2 hours before departing; two physicians who
had worked in the Hanoi French hospital and left the plane
with him; and four healthcare workers of CDG medical
services who cared for him. Two taxi drivers (one 1 1/2-
hour drive from CDG to his home and one 1/2-hour drive
from his home to the infectious disease hospital where he
was admitted) were also exposed to patient A, who was
then wearing a mask. None of these nine persons had any
symptoms during the 10 days after exposure.
SARS did not develop in any of the 30 unprotected per-
sons who had contact with the three secondary confirmed
cases after their onset of fever (duration of contact <1/2
hour to 3 days; <2 hours for 26 [86.7%]). However, a
febrile illness for 2 days, with no other symptoms, devel-
oped in a household contact of patient D, who had a close
unprotected contact with him for about 1/2 hour at onset of
his symptoms (malaise and fever); a chest x-ray was nor-
mal and lymphocyte count was 441/mm3. RT-PCR on
nasal and pharyngeal swab was negative for SARS-CoV.
Three healthcare workers who cared for patient D and
used masks for droplet protection had brief episodes
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Figure 1. Cases of SARS, by date of onset and exposure, labora-
tory results and type of exposures, France, March-April, 2003.(<24 hours) of mild fever without any respiratory symp-
toms and chest x-ray changes. These three episodes were
attributed to a common, unidentified, local viral infection. 
Discussion
The surveillance system was able to detect the first
patient with SARS (patient A) and one of his secondary
case-patients (patient D). Follow-up of passengers seated
within two rows of patient A, and the information given to
the other passengers of flight AF171 flight allowed
patients B and C to be identified. Therefore, all case-
patients were identified early in the course of the disease
and placed under isolation, which contributed to reduction
in the risk of secondary transmission and diffusion (16).
Only four of the five probable cases were confirmed either
by RT-PCR or serologic testing, although all five met the
probable SARS case definition. Although specific, the sen-
sitivity of the RT-PCR–based detection technique remains
to be fully evaluated (7). In addition, the time at which res-
piratory specimens were taken could account for the fact
that virus shedding remained undetected for one patient
(patient D). 
Of the persons who came into contact with a sympto-
matic SARS patient in France, 30 did not have masks for
droplet protection and were exposed, and 26 (86.7%) were
exposed for a limited amount of time at the onset of illness.
No probable case of SARS was identified among these
persons; a household contact of patient D had a febrile ill-
ness (>38°C) without any other symptoms and tested neg-
ative for the SARS-CoV by RT-PCR. Four contacts of
SARS cases had an episode of transient, mild or low-grade
fever without other signs, including three healthcare work-
ers of the hospital where patient D had been admitted and
the passenger seated next to patient A during the AF171
flight. Specific antibody testing will be the only way to
evaluate if these persons with mild symptoms could have
been infected by the SARS-CoV. 
Since no other exposure could be found within 10 days
of onset for patients B and C, their probable source of
infection is contact with patient Awhile in flight, boarding,
or disembarking flight AF 171. For patient B, we cannot
formally exclude an unrecognized community exposure in
Hanoi during the 10 days before departure. However, the
fact that the SARS outbreak was controlled quite rapidly
(17), without any formal documentation of community
transmission, a large unrecognized community transmis-
sion most likely did not occur. Patient B, in addition to sit-
ting within two rows of patient A, had contact with patient
A when he moved to and from the lavatory (at least four
close contacts while going and coming at least twice from
the lavatory). Although a precise date of fever onset is not
available for patient A, it appears that he was already
symptomatic in the plane and was likely infectious. This
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Figure 2. Seats occupied by Probable case-patients with  SARS
and close contacts to patient A, Air France Flight 171, Hanoi-Paris,
22-23 March, 2003. Numbers and letters in bold indicate seat
lanes and rows, respectively. Patient A occupied seat 26L (next to
the window). Seats of close passengers who were followed-up for
10 days are indicated by an X. They included two passengers who
sat in the row ahead (25K and 25J, there was no seat at 25L), two
passengers who occupied seats 26K and 26J, and three passen-
gers who sat in the row behind (27J, 27K, and 27L). A row with no
seats separated row 27 from row 28; a partition separated row 25
from the rest of the cabin. Consequently, passengers seated in
rows 28 and 24 were excluded. The lavatories are indicated (WC).
Patients A and B used the front  lavatory (WC1) while patient C
used the one in the back (WC4). The arrow between seat 26L and
the lavatory WC1 indicates that patient A passed through the
empty space between the plane wall and seat 25K where patient
B was seated.finding is based on the following evidence: 1) some per-
sons who had met him in Hanoi before his departure
reported that he had fatigue and fits of cough; 2) the pas-
sengers closest to him on the plane reported that he was
dyspneic; and 3) his initial evaluation at admission to hos-
pital on March 23 showed bilateral extended interstitial
pneumonia and hypoxemia. The last strongly supports the
hypothesis that his illness was ongoing for 3 to 8 days
(1,5,8). 
For patient C, the exact mode of acquisition of SARS
remains a matter of debate, since he was neither found to
have close contact with patient A nor other documented
exposure. He had been traveling to Thailand, a country
where local transmission has never been reported by WHO
(18). Although airborne transmission on the plane cannot
be ruled out, a possible hypothesis is an undocumented
direct or indirect contact with patient A while boarding or
on the plane. Our investigation also indicates that the risk
for acquiring SARS after a contact with a symptomatic
case is very heterogeneous, since prolonged contact does
not necessarily result in transmission and, conversely, a
brief or distant exposure might be sufficient. Factors that
may explain this observation are the following: 1) the virus
excretion varies over time, 2) the susceptibility to the
SARS-CoV may vary among persons exposed, and 3)
exposure results in asymptomatic infection. 
Although our study is descriptive and was not designed
to evaluate SARS control measures, our results support the
usefulness of recommendations made to prevent the prop-
agation of SARS through air travel (i.e., that persons sus-
pected to have SARS should not fly [14]). We also believe
that timely and sensitive surveillance associated with
prompt and strict isolation of cases and quarantine of con-
tacts were effective public health tools to limit the second-
ary spread of SARS in France.
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